

Message Text

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ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 IO-11 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SAM-01 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 OMB-01

ARA-06 EB-07 /110 W

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P R 030820Z MAR 76G

FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9373

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

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FBIS OKINAWA

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

COMIPAC

CHMAAGCHINA

COMUSTDC

CDR USACC TAIWAN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 HONG KONG 2452

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT PFOR CH

SUBJECT: WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NO. 9

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SUMMARY: THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN MOVED FORWARD WITH OPEN NAMING OF TENG HSIAO-PING IN PEKING UNIVERSITIES' WALL POSTERS. STILL, THE PLA REMAINS ON THE SIDELINES AND THE CAMPAIGN CONTINUES TO APPEAR UNDER CONTROL. IN OTHER PARTS OF CHINA, THE CAMPAIGN HAS SPREAD FROM THE CAMPUSES TO THE FACTORIES WITH CANTON STREET POSTERS PURPORTEDLY INCLUDING CRITICISM OF THE LATE PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI. EXTERNALLY, THE NIXON VISIT ENDED AND THE PRC INDICATED SOME RESPONSE TO US CRITICISM OF THE TRIP IN ACTING PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG'S TOAST AT THE RETURN BANQUET. THE LOCAL PRC-OWNED PRESS HAS BEEN QUICK TO POUNCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON THE WORD "DETENTE" IN DESCRIBING SOVIET-US RELATIONS. COMMEMORATION OF THE FEBRUARY 28, 1947 TAIWAN UPRISING AGAIN STRESSED PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. END SUMMARY

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1. INTERNAL SCENE: CAMPAIGN TAKES ANOTHER STEP FORWARD

PEKING'S MONTH-OLD IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE/POWER STRUGGLE MOVED A NOTCH HIGHER IN ITS PUBLIC FORMS AS PEKING UNIVERSITIES OPENLY BANDIED THE NAME OF VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING ON THEIR POSTERS (HK 2272). IN TURN, THE PUBLIC MEDIA--INCLUDING THE LEAD ARTICLE IN MARCH'S REF FLAG--WENT ONE STEP FURTHER AND QUOTED AN OFT-CITED TENG HSIAO-PING STATEMENT AS WELL

AS MAKING A NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO "THAT PERSON" BEHIND THE ANTI-MAO REVISIONIST LINE (HK 2342). LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2. THE CONTROLLED PACE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TENG AND HIS SUPPORTERS IS STRIKING AND MAY BE RELATED TO THE CONTINUED ONLOOKER ROLE OF THE PLA (PARA 5). THE PACE ALSO SUGGESTS A DIRECTION FROM THE TOP WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SPELLED OUT BY THE EDITORIAL DIRECTIVES NORMALLY ISSUED PRIOR TO POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING IN CHINA. THE CLOSEST STATEMENT TO INDICATE SPECIFIC DIRECTION COMES FROM A YUNNAN BROADCAST EXPOUNDING A PACED ATTACK FROM TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY EXPERIENCE: "FIRST WITHIN THE PARTY, THEN OUTSIDE THE PARTY, FIRST THE LEADERSHIP, THEN THE MASSES, GRADUALLY EXPANDING, MOBILIZING AT ALL LEVELS AND DOING A GOOD JOB OF POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL WORK" (FEBRUARY 29). LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3. THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THE CAMPAIGNING--INCLUDING THE POSTERS--SEEMS TO BE SPREADING FROM UNIVERSITIES INTO FACTORIES AND MIDDLE SCHOOLS. PROVINCIAL POSTER-PASTING APPEARS SOMEWHAT LESS RESTRAINED THAN IN PEKING WITH A NUMBER OF LOCAL LEADERS ALSO COMING UNDER ATTACK. CANTON POSTERS EVEN INCLUDE A REPORTED CHALLENGE TO THE LATE PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI FOR HAVING REHABILITATED TENG IN 1973. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

4. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SIGNS OF ANY DIRECT CAMPAIGN INFLUENCE ON OTHER ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, EVEN THIS GRADUAL PACE TO THE CAMPAIGNING COULD BECOME WORRISOME FOR THE PLANNERS. REPORTS OF POSTERS IN CANTON BY DEMOBILIZED SERVICEMEN REFERRING TO OLD WAGE ISSUES (PEKING 349) COULD BE AN UNPLANNED BROADENING OF THE CAMPAIGN. AND, WHILE OTHER EXPLANATIONS MAY BE MORE LIKELY, STATEMENTS THAT CHINA'S PRODUCE SHIPMENTS TO HONG KONG HAVE DECLINED MAY BE AN CONFIDENTIAL

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INITIAL INDICATOR OF A POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

5. THE PLA AND THE CAMPAIGN

THE CONTROL WHICH WE HAVE NOTED IN THE PRESENT ANTI-RIGHTIST CAMPAIGN MAY IN PART BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE PLA. AT THE COMMEMORATION OF THE FEBRUARY 28 UPRISING ON TAIWAN (PARA 17), THE PLA APPEARED TO BE SIGNALLING ITS SUPPORT FOR MODERATION AND A CONTROLLED CAMPAIGN PACE. THE PLA TURNOUT INCLUDED SEVERAL HIGH-RANKING MILITARY FIGURES WHO WERE BITTERLY CRITICIZED AND PURGED DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. IT WAS HEADED BY CHEN HSI-LIEN (ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER BUT NOT SO IDENTIFIED), WHO HAS HAD A LONG ASSOCIATION WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING. IN ADDITION, THE SPEAKER

AT THE EVENT, UNITED-FRONT MAN LIAO CHENG-CHIH, REPEATED ACTING PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG'S DESCRIPTION OF THE CAMPAIGN IN THE MILDEST OF TERMS, PRESUMABLY WITH PLA APPROVAL. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

6. MEANWHILE, A PLA LITERARY JOURNAL IN FEBRUARY GAVE THE CHOU FUNERAL FULL COVERAGE AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS IGNORED BY THE PARTY JOURNAL, REF FLAG. PLA REGARD FOR CHOU, WHOM MANY IN THE MILITARY VIEW AS THE TRUE FOUNDER OF THE PLA, IS HIGH, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THE CURRENT STRUGGLE IMPLIES A DENIGRATION OF CHOU AND HIS POLICIES, WE WOULD EXPECT IT TO PRODUCE RESENTMENT AND RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF THE PLA ESTABLISHMENT (HK 2433). LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

7. INTERNAL DEBATE: THE SOVIET CONNECTION

PEKING'S PROPAGANDISTS HAVE ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO THE INTERNAL DEBATE THIS WEEK BY INCLUDING IN THEIR DAILY ANTI-SOVIET ATTACKS (PARA 15) CHARGES WHICH HAVE CLEAR IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC POLICY (HK 2273). THUS THE CHINESE HAVE DENOUNCED MOSCOW FOR OVEREMPHASIZING HEAVY INDUSTRY (PEKING DOMESTIC FEB. 24), CRAVING FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY (NCNA, MARCH 1), USING MATERIAL INCENTIVES AND PACKING THE PARTY LEADERSHIP THROUGH REHABILITATION OF OLD CADRES (NCNA, FEB. 26), ALL ISSUES IN THE CURRENT CHINESE INTERNAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST REVISIONISTS. FURTHERMORE, A FEBRUARY 28 NCNA ARTICLE SHARPLY ATTACKED THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET EDUCATION SYSTEM FOR RELYING ON EXPERTS TO RUN SCHOOLS AND KEEPING WORKING CLASS CHILDREN OUT OF COLLEGE, THE VERY CHARGES WHICH TOUCHED OFF CHINA'S CURRENT DOMESTIC STRUGGLE LAST FALL. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

8. IT IS CLEAR THAT ONE PURPOSE OF THIS PROPAGANDA WAVE IS TO TAR CHINA'S MODERATES WITH THE SOVIET REVISIONIST BRUSH. A LIANG HSIAO ARTICLE IN PEOPLE'S DAILY FEBRUARY 27 MAKES THIS EXPLICIT BY CITING MOSCOW ATTACKS ON CHINA'S EDUCATION SYSTEM, CLEARLY IMPLYING THAT CHINA'S REVISIONISTS HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE HATED SOVIETS. ALONG WITH POSTER ATTACKS ON TENG HSIAO-PING AS A "NEW KHRUSHCHEV," THIS PROPAGANDA RECALLS THE PRO-SOVIET LABEL PINNED ON BOTH LIU SHAO-CHI AND LIN PIAO AT THE TIME OF THEIR FALLS FROM POWER. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SAM-01 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 OMB-01

ARA-06 EB-07 /110 W
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P R 030820Z MAR 76
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9374
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
FBIS OKINAWA
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMIPAC
CHMAAGCHINA
COMUSTDC
CDR USACC TAIWAN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 HONG KONG 2452

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

9. FUNERALS, APPEARANCES AND APPOINTMENTS

THE FEB 27. FUNERAL OF KUO LI, A PREVIOUSLY UNIDENTIFIED VICE MINISTER OF THE FIRST MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING, WAS THE SETTING FOR THE SECOND STARRING ROLE IN TWO WEEKS OF THE YOUNG VICE PREMIER SUN CHEIN. SUN, WHO LAST WEEK MET WITH THE DEPARTING HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR, HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS HAVING INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES (HK 1014), AND HIS ATTENDANCE AT THIS MEMORIAL SERVICE FURTHER INDICATES THAT LIKELIHOOD. THE ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE SERVICE INCLUDED A LARGE GROUP OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION REHABILITEES, MENTIONED AS FRIENDS OF KUO, BUT NONE WERE IDENTIFIED BY PARTY OR GOVERNMENTAL TITLE. NO MINISTER OF FIRST MACHINE BUILDING WAS MENTIONED, AND WE ASSUME THAT THIS POST CONTINUES TO REMAIN VACANT. UNCLASSIFIED

10. MAKING THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF A TOP-RANKED TECHNOCRAT SINCE THE APPOINTMENT OF HUA KUO-FENG, VICE PREMIER KY MU MET WITH A SYRIAN ECONOMIC DELEGATION. MEANWHILE, A BANQUET FOR A JAPANESE TELEVISION DELEGATION WAS HOSTED BY TENG KANG, WHO WAS IDENTIFIED FOR THE FIRST TIME AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE

CENTRAL BROADCASTING ADMINISTRATION. TENG, WHO HAS BEEN PROMINENT IN PEKING JOURNALIST CIRCLES SINCE 1973, HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DESIGNED ONLY AS THE ACTING DIRECTOR. UNCLASSIFIED

1. THE UNITED STATES

THE NIXON VISIT: PART II.

AT THE FEBRUARY 25 RETURN BANQUET HOSTED BY MR. NIXON, ACTING PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG SEEMED TO BE RESPONDING TO US SENSITIVITIES AND CRITICISM ABOUT THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA. HUA CITED NIXON'S CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-US RELATIONS, THEN POINTEDLY ADDED "ALTHOUGH HE NO LONGER
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HOLDS ANY PUBLIC OFFICE," HE NOTED THAT NIXON AND CHINESE LEADERS HAD HELD "SEVERAL CANDID AND UNRESTRAINED TALKS", REVIEWED CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND "EXCHANGED VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST," BEFORE TOASTING THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT FORD. MEANWHILE, LOCAL PRC-OWNED PAPERS HAVE CONTINUED TO CARRY WIRE SERVICE REPORTS THAT THE FORMER PRESIDENT WILL BRIEF THE USG ON HIS VISIT.

12. EARLIER ON THE DAY OF THE BANQUET, ACCOMPANIED BY FONMIN

CHAAO KUAN-HUA AND PRCLO CHEIF HUANG CHEN, THE NIXONS HAD VIEWED POSTERS AT TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY AND WERE BRIEFED BY THE UNIVERSITY'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN CHIN CHUN ON THE "CURRENT GREAT DEBATE" ON THE REVOLUTION IN EDUCATION. THE FOLLOWING MORNING THE NIXONS DEPARTED FOR VISITS TO KWEILIN AND CANTON IN THE COMPANY OF NPC VICE CHAIRMAN YAO LIEN-WEI AND HUANG CHEN, PROTOCOL CHIEF CHU CHUAN-HSIEN AGAIN ACCOMPANIED THEM ON THEIR SPECIAL CAAC FLIGHT TO CALIFORNIA (PEKING 317 AND 325; NCNA FEB 25-29). LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

13. THE PRESIDENT ON "DETENTE"

LOCAL PRC-OWNED PAPERS HAVE BEEN QUICK TO NOTE PRESIDENT FORD'S RECENT STATEMENT INDICATING THAT HE WILL NO LONGER USE THE WORD "DETENTE" IN DESCRIBING OUR POLICIES AND RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND HAVE OBSERVED THAT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY SECRETARY KISSINGER WILL BE TRAVELING TO MOSCOW IN THE NEAR FUTURE. UNCLASSIFIED

14. THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO LATIN AMERICAN

NCNA ON FEBRUARY 26 PROVIDED CHINA'S ESSENTIALLY CRITICAL REPORT ON THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA. NCNA COMMENTED THAT THE TRIP CAME AFTER REPEATED POSTPONEMENTS, AT A TIME WHEN CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY ACUTE, AND DURING A PERIOD IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE INTENSIFIED SUPPORT FOR LATIN AMERICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. AFTER CITING PRESS COMMENTS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WAS TO "ASSUAGE" LATIN AMERICAN DISSATISFACTION, NCNA NOTED THE SECRETARY'S SIX-POINT PROPOSAL TO "INVIGORATE" US-LATIN
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AMERICAN RELATIONS THEN ADDED PRESS CONTENTIONS THAT THERE CAN BE "NO SOLUTION" TO ISSUES BETWEEN THE US AND THE LATIN AMERICANS. NCNA ALSO CITED THE SECRETARY'S FEBRUARY 24 STATEMENT IN COSTA RICA INDICATING THAT THE US WILL NOT TOLERATE A CHALLENGE TO THE "SOLEMN TREATY PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION IN THIS HEMISPHERE. HOWEVER, IT HAS ALSO NOTED VENEZUELAN PRESS CRITICISM OF SOVIET INTERVENTIONIST MOVES, THE VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT AND OAU REPRESENTATIVE'S ASSERTIONS THAT NO COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, AND A LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND COORDINATION IN DEALING WITH THE US (NCNA, FEB 26 AND 27) UNCLASSIFIED

15. THE SOVIET UNION

WITH THE 25TH CPSU UNDERWAY IN MOSCOW, PRC MEDIA ATTACKS ON SOVIET POLICIES REMAIN AT A HIGH LEVEL AND THERE HAS BEEN

CONSIDERABLE REPLAY OF FOREIGN CRITICISM OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH. MUCH OF THE CURRENT PRC MEDIA ANTI-SOVIET INVECTIVE, HOWEVER, APPEARS MORE DIRECTED TO THE INTERNAL CHINESE AUDIENCE AND ECHOES MANY OF THE CHARGES CURRENTLY BEING HURLED AGAINST TENG HSIAO-PING (NCNA, FEB 26-MARCH 2; HK 2273; AND PARA 1). LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

16. JAPAN

A STREAM OF NCNA REPORTS HAVE NOTED THE CRITICAL REACTIONS IN JAPAN TO BREZHEV'S RECENT STATEMENTS AT THE 25TH CPSU TERMING JAPAN'S CLAIM TO THE DISPUTED NORTHERN TERRITORIES "GROUNDLESS AND UNLAWFUL". A MARCH 2 NCNA REPORT NOTED THAT A JAPANESE FOMIN OFFICIAL HAD CALLED IN THE SOVIET CHARGE TO EXPRESS PUZZLEMENT WITH THE SOVIET STATEMENT. THE REITERATION OF THE JAPANESE POSITION THAT THE RETURN OF THE FOUR SOVIET-HELD ISLANDS IS A RECONDITION FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION IS UNDOUBTEDLY WELCOMED BY THE CHINESE (NCNA FEB. 25-MARCH 2). UNCLASSIFIED

17. TAIWAN

PEKING'S COMMEMORATION OF THE FEBRUARY 28, 1947 TAIWAN UPRISING WAS SINILAR TO THE 1975 RALLY WITH THE EMPHASIS
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ON THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN. ONCE AGAIN THE TOP PRC LEADERSHIP AT THE RALLY WAS MILITARY (CHEN HSI-LIEN AND HSU HSIANG-CHIEN) BUT THE SPEECK MAKING WAS LEFT AS USUAL TO LIAO CHEN-CHIH, SUPPORTED BY VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EX-KMT OFFICIALS RELEASED FROM PRISON DURING 1975 AND FROM LONG-TIME "TAIWANESE COMPATRIOTS" LIVING ON THE MAINLAND. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IN THE REUNIFICATION PROCESS, AND LIAO STRESSED THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN THEMSELVES, WITH SOME MODEST ASSISTANCE FROM THE MAINLAND, IN REUNIFYING CHINA. NCNA ALSO CARRIED REPORTS OF RALIES IN OTHER PARTS OF CHINA AND IN THE US, WHILE THE HONG KONG PRC-OWNED PRESS CONCENTRATED ON INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER TAIWAN RESIDENTS WHO HAVE FOUND A "BRIGHT-FUTURE" BY MOVING TO THE MAINLAND (NCNA, FEB 27-29 AND HK 2318)
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18. US PLANES IN CAMBODIA

NCNA FEBRUARY 29 CARRIED EXCERPTS OF THE CAMBODIAN FEBRUARY 26 STATEMENT ON THE ALLEGED BOMBING OF SIEM REAP. IN THE SAME ITEM NCNA INCLUDED A FINAL PARAGRAPH ON THE FEBRUARY 28 RALLY IN PHNOM PENH. THE PRC MEDIA, HOWEVER, HAVE AVOIDED SELF-GENERATED COMMENT ON THE SUPPOSED INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH SUPPORTING STATEMETS BY OTHER ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAVE ALSO BEEN CARRIED BY NCNA. UNCLASSIFIED

19. . . AND IN KOREA

IN A SIMILAR VEIN, NCNA REPORTED EXCERPTS FROM THE NORTH KOREAN
FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FROM THE DPRK MILITARY ARMISTICE
COMMISSIONS'S DELEGATION PROTEST AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF
F-111 AIRCRAFT INTO SOUTH KOREA. AGAIN, THE PRC MEDIA HAVE
NOT COMMENTED DIRECTLY ON THE ISSUE (NCNA FEB 27)
UNCLASSIFIED

20. ASEAN

THE PRC CONTINUED (WR 8) ITS FAVORABLE PRESS TREATMENT OF
THE ASEAN SUMMIT MEETING, WITH NCNA PROVIDING A WRAPUP OF
THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, TREATY, AND DECLARATION ISSUED AT BALI.
THE NCNA ARTICLE POINTED TO THE "STRENGTHENING OF UNITY AND
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REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION" AS WELL AS STEPS TOWARD
REALIZATION OF THE SEA ZONE OF PEACE. IN A SEPERATE ITEM
NCNA CITES THE PHILIPPINE ORIENT NEWS AS CALLING FOR A
SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR THE SOUTHEAST ASIANS WITH NO SUPERPOWER
INTERFERENCE. THIS ARTICLE STRESSES THE THIRD WORLD TIES
OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, A STANDARD PEKING THEME (NCNA,
FEB 25-28) UNCLASSIFIED.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SUMMARIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976HONGK02452
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760081-0918
From: HONG KONG
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197603100/aaaadkmj.tel
Line Count: 468
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 MAR 2004 by MartinML>; APPROVED <04 AUG 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NO. 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CH
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006